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ABSTRACT
Do media influence government or does government influence media? This paper seeks to answer this question 
by examining the recent international humanitarian military intervention in Libya in 2011 to see what, if any, effect 
media played in the decision-making process. To determine which player, U.S. government or U.S. media, was 
the opinion leader persuading the other to support humanitarian military intervention, the author chronologically 
compared articles written in major U.S. newspapers and U.S. government statements. The author concludes that 
neither the U.S. government nor the U.S. media played the primary role in the case. Rather, opinion leaders were 
the most persuasive, but U.S. media played an essential supporting role. 
INTRODUCTION
A central tenet of democracy is that it reflects the will of the people it governs. In a representative democracy, 
the constituent opinions inform political representatives, who act on their behalf. This requires an engaged 
public. However, frequently citizens lack informed opinions on foreign policy because international relations do 
not usually have a personal, immediate impact on them. When citizens cannot rely on personal experience, the 
media plays a critical role in informing citizens, shaping public opinion, and indirectly influencing foreign policy 
decisions. 
As the globalized world becomes increasingly interdependent, it becomes essential for democratic nations to 
have thoughtful foreign policies supported by knowledgeable citizens. As a result, media’s role in shaping public 
opinion on international affairs is important for governments to understand. 
With the rise of international organizations following World War II, governments accepted a collective 
responsibility to prevent wars, including civil wars, to protect vulnerable citizens from violence. Additionally, 
inaction in Srebrenica and Rwanda bolstered the resolve of U.N. members, particularly the United States and 
Western European nations, to protect others by highlighting the devastation on the collective moral conscience 
and the high cost of repairing communities and countries when there is a failure to act. 
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Humanitarian military intervention is “the use of military force by one or more states within the jurisdiction 
of another, without its permission, to protect innocent people from violence by the target state’s government.”1 
The justification for such intervention is one of moral consciousness because “when a government turns savagely 
upon its own people it becomes the responsibility of any state capable of stopping the slaughter to try to do so.”2 
By international agreement, the right to take such action has existed for quite some time: Articles 39, 41, and 42 
of Chapter 8 in the United Nation’s Charter grants its Security Council the authority to “take action by air, sea and 
land in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.”3 By joining the United Nations, all member 
countries recognize the organization’s authority for humanitarian military intervention. 
More recently, the United Nations clarified when and where its members would intervene. In 2005, the 
United Nations adopted a resolution on the “Responsibility to Protect,” which sought to prevent genocide, war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.4 Before adopting the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, 
the threshold for intervention was so high that it became “a catch-22: by the time it is clear that a genocide 
is occurring, it is often too late to stop the killing.”5 The new Responsibility to Protect doctrine seeks to prevent 
rather than react to genocide and other atrocities, as long as there is international consensus for action and the 
proposed action is feasible. 
The humanitarian military intervention in Libya marks the first instance that the U.N. used the Responsibility 
to Protect doctrine to justify international actions against a sovereign nation. Understanding how international 
actors reached a consensus, particularly what role the media played in increasing public awareness and demand 
for action, will be important for advocates of future interventions, especially those who advocate for intervention 
in the civil war in Syria. 
There are two prevailing and opposing theories regarding media’s role in shaping public opinion. One 
theory posits that media could serve as a “watchdog” and hold government officials accountable for their actions 
by informing the public. The countervailing idea holds that the media is the “lapdog” of government and only 
repeats the government’s opinion, inadvertently serving as its mouthpiece. Do media influence government or 
does government influence media? 
This paper answers this question by examining the international humanitarian military intervention in Libya in 
2011 to see what, if any, effect U.S. media played in the U.S. government decision-making process. 
BACKGROUND
Before the military intervention, relations between the U.S. and Libya were best defined as “wary but distant with 
almost no direct mutual interests at stake.”6 During the 1980s, Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi sanctioned the 
bombing of a Pan Am plane over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 270 people; the bombing of a disco in Germany; 
and began a nuclear program while making threats against Western countries.7  All of these events led President 
Reagan to call Gadhafi “the mad dog of the Middle East” and U.S.-Libyan relations were extremely limited for the 
next two decades.8 In the early 2000s, Gadhafi accepted blame for the terrorist acts and terminated his weapons 
of mass destruction programs, enabling the U.S. to tolerate his leadership.
On February 15, 2011, following the arrest of human rights attorney Fathi Terbil who represented the 
families of the 1,200 Abu Salim prisoners allegedly massacred in 1996, Libyans began protesting.9 Terbil was 
1	 	Robert	A.	Pape,	“When	Duty	Calls:	A	Pragmatic	Standard	of	Humanitarian	Intervention,”	International Security 37, no. 1, (2012): 44. 
2	 	Amos	N.	Guiora,	“Intervention	in	Libya,	Yes;	Intervention	in	Syria,	No:	Deciphering	the	Obama	Administration,”	Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 44, no. 1 (2011): 257.
3	 	M.	Hakimi,	H.	Koh,	H.	Hassouna,	C.	Powell,	M.	O’Connell,	and	A.	Aujali,	“Revolution	and	Intervention	in	the	Middle	East,”	
Proceedings	of	the	Annual	Meeting,	American	Society	of	International	Law,	105,	555.
4	 	Jim	Murphy,	Dan	Smith	and	Michael	Harvey,	“Crossing	the	Line,”	Public Policy Research 18, no. 1 (2011): 11.
5	 	Pape,	“When	Duty	Calls,”	42.	
6	 	Guiora,	“Intervention	in	Libya,	Yes;	Intervention	in	Syria,	No:	Deciphering	the	Obama	Administration,”	265.
7	 	Dirk	Vandewalle,	“The	Many	Qaddafis,”	New York Times, February 24, 2011. 
8	 	Vandewalle,	“The	Many	Qaddafis”;	Sergey	Kostyaev,	“Regime	Change	and	Arab	Countries’	Lobbying	in	the	United	States,”	
Arab Studies Quarterly	35,	no.	1	(2013):	65.
9	 	Najla	Abdurrahman,	“What	if	Libya	Staged	a	Revolution	and	Nobody	Came?”	Foreign Policy,	February	17,	2011,	http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/17/what_if_	libya_staged_a_revolution_and_nobody_came.
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released unharmed, but the protests evolved into an anti-government movement similar to the ones involving 
their Tunisian and Egyptian neighbors around the same time.10 Unlike Mubarak and Ben Ali, Gadhafi responded 
immediately with disproportionate military force and threatened to show no mercy. He vowed to kill all protesters 
by “going house to house” and fighting until his last drop of blood.11 Gadhafi’s son threatened “rivers of blood” 
if the nation abandoned his father.12 Gadhafi also described protesters as rats, cockroaches, and drug abusers.13 
His word choice in referring to his enemies as “cockroaches” was eerily similar to the Hutu radio broadcasts 
against the Tutsis in Rwanda during the country’s 1994 genocide.14 
In the words of Catherine Powell, “the Libyan people appealed to the world to help stop the brutal attacks 
on them, and the world listened.”15 Over the next week, numerous international organizations issued statements 
condemning the violence by the Libyan government, including the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), 
the African Union, and the United Nations.16 Beyond this, the Arab League and the United Nations suspended 
Libya’s membership17 and the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1970, which imposed an arms 
embargo, froze assets, and prohibited travel by government officials.18
As the violence escalated, so did the international response. The U.S. Senate, the OIC, and the Arab League 
all called for a no-fly zone.19 In an unprecedented use of the U.N. Responsibility to Protect doctrine, the Security 
Council issued Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011, which established a no-fly zone over Libya and authorized 
member states “to take all necessary measures” to protect the Libyan people.20 The next day, President Obama 
spoke to the American public to explain why the United States was participating in a military intervention. He 
said:21
Left unchecked, we have every reason to believe that Qaddafi would commit atrocities against his 
people. Many thousands could die. A humanitarian crisis would ensue. The entire region could 
be destabilized, endangering many of our allies and partners. The calls of the Libyan people 
for help would go unanswered. The democratic values that we stand for would be overrun. 
Moreover, the words of the international community would be rendered hollow.
By the time fall arrived, there was a new government in Libya, Gadhafi had been killed, the U.N. embargoes 
were lifted, the U.S. had spent one billion dollars on the intervention, and NATO had flown more than 22,000 
missions.22
10	 	Ibid.
11	 	Kareem	Fahim	and	David	D.	Kirkpatrick,	“Qaddafi’s	Grip	on	the	Capital	Tightens	as	Revolt	Grows,”	New York Times, 
February	23,	2011.	http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/23/	world/africa/23libya.html.
12	 	David	D.	Kirkpatrick	and	Mona	El	Naggar,	“Qaddafi’s	forces	strike	with	fury	as	unrest	grows,”	New York Times, February 22, 2011.
13	 	Vandewalle,	“The	Many	Qaddafis.”
14	 	Ibid.	
15	 	Hakimi,	et.	al,	“Revolution	and	Intervention	in	the	Middle	East.”
16	 	“Resolution	2009	(2011),”	U.N.	Security	Council,	6620	Meeting,	September	16,	2011.
17	 	Paul	D.	Williams,	“The	Road	to	Humanitarian	War	in	Libya,”	Global Responsibility to Protect	3,	no.	2	(2011):	248-251.
18	 	“Resolution	1970	(2011),”	U.N.	Security	Council,	6491th	Meeting,	February	26,	2011.
19	 	“Condemning	Violations	of	Human	Rights	in	Libya,”	U.S.	Senate	Resolution	85,	112th	Congress,	March	1,	2011;	Organization	
of	Islamic	Cooperation,	“Ihsanoglu	Support	No-Fly	Decision	At	OIC	Meeting	On	Libya,	Calls	For	An	Islamic	Humanitarian	Programme	
In	And	Outside	Libya,”	March	8,	2011,	http://www.oicoci.org/oicv2/topic/?t_id=5031&ref=2111&lan=en.
20	 	“Resolution	1973	(2011),”	U.N.	Security	Council,	6498	Meeting,	March	17,	2011.	
21	 	Barack	Obama,	“Remarks	by	the	President	on	the	Situation	in	Libya,”	March	18,	2011,	http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/03/18/remarks-president-situation-libya.
22	 	“Resolution	2009	(2011),”	U.N.	Security	Council;	Michael	Hastings,	“Inside	Obama’s	War	Room:	U.S.	Humanitarian	
Intervention	in	Libya,”	Rolling Stone no.	1142,	(October	2011):	47-52,	86,	88-89;	David	Kirkpatrick	and	Suliman	Ali	Zway,	“Spy	chief	
for	Qaddafi	is	extradited	to	Libya,”	New York Times,	September	6,	2012,	http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/06/world/	africa/senussi-
qaddafi-spy-chief-is-extradited-to-libya.html.
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RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Based on the two opposing hypotheses, this case study examined the humanitarian intervention in Libya by 
posing the following research questions: 
RQ1: Who was first to call the American people to action, the U.S. media, or President 
Obama?
This question is relevant because an actor that speaks first has greater access to the spotlight and a leadership 
role, galvanizing following supporters.  Speaking first also prevents the perception of bandwagon participation 
that can stigmatize latecomers or taint neutrality in a moment of moral crisis.
RQ2: Who spoke most persuasively to convince the American public that a humanitarian 
military intervention was necessary?
Although who called for the intervention first is an important question to answer, who convinced the American 
public is the crucial question because persuasion of the public would identify who set the agenda, both for the 
news and at the policy table. Furthermore, this information is crucial to future advocates of interventions because 
they need to know who to convince that their cause is worthy of engagement.
The answers to these research questions determine if media influenced government or if government 
influenced media in the U.S. involvement in Libya.
LITERARY REVIEW
CNN Effect
The world has become more globalized and interdependent. With this shrinking world based on new technology 
— including social media, satellite television, and 24-hour news broadcasting — the time between an event 
occurring and the demand for the government to make a statement or policy decision has collapsed. 
An oft-cited example of decision-making before the 24-hour news cycle is the Cuban missile crisis. President 
Kennedy had six days to speak to advisors, deliberate, and decide a course of action before the media reported the 
incident to the American public.23 When the Benghazi crisis occurred in Libya on September 11, 2012, President 
Obama had less than 24 hours to learn the facts and make a public statement.24 The instantaneous, continuous, 
and global media coverage influencing public opinion, “demanding instant responses from government officials, 
[and] shaping and reshaping foreign policy” without careful consideration is called the CNN effect.25 
Stephen Livingston suggests that the media can impact foreign policy as an accelerant, an impediment, or 
as an agenda-setter.26 Media serve as an accelerant, condensing the time in which decision makers can form 
their responses and serving as a “force multiplier” by increasing the communication among decision makers.27 
Though accelerating responses means that progress is made, Frizis points out that actions spurred by media are 
not necessarily preferred because it sensationalizes foreign affairs and “impairs the quality of both the gathering 
of intelligence and of the actual response formation.”28
23	 	Srivastava,	S.	“The	Role	of	the	Media	in	Foreign	Policy:	A	Decision-Making,”	(Presented	at	the	7th	AMSAR	Conference	on	
Roles	of	Media	during	Political	Crisis,	Bangkok,	Thailand,	May	20,	2009):	2.
24	 	Barack	Obama,	“Remarks	by	the	President	on	the	Deaths	of	U.S.	Embassy	Staff	in	Libya”	September	12,	2012.	http://www.
whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/12/remarks-president-deaths-us-embassy-staff-libya%20
25	 	Warren	P.	Strobel,	“The	CNN	Effect,”	The American Journalism Review Supplement 33, (1996).
26	 	Steven	Livingston,	“Clarifying	the	CNN	Effect:	An	Examinaton	of	Media	Effects	According	to	Type	of	Military	Intervention,”	
Research	paper,	Harvard	University,	1997.
27	 	Ibid.
28	 	Iakov	Frizis,	“The	Impact	of	Media	on	Foreign	Policy,”	e-International Relations, May	10,	2013,	http://www.e-ir.
info/2013/05/10/the-impact-of-media-on-foreign-policy/.
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As an impediment, media act as an “emotional inhibitor,” undermining government by covering events with 
a negative view, such as daily body counts during the Vietnam War or by reporting information that can hurt 
operational security.29 
Finally, and most relevant to this case study, media can serve as an agenda-setter. Agenda-setting is the act 
of increasing the public’s awareness, or as Cohen succinctly puts it, “telling its readers what to think about.”30 
Cohen argues that calling attention to something is not the same as controlling what the public thinks, but it does 
create a scenario in which the public demands a government response that might not have occurred otherwise. If 
the CNN effect occurred, spurring the U.S. government to intervene in Libya, the media’s role was that of raising 
the public’s awareness through extensive and persuasive coverage. The public, made aware of Libya’s plight, 
would then call upon government to act, thus making media the agenda-setter. 
Manufactured Consent
The opposing theory to the CNN effect is the manufacturing consent theory, which argues that the government 
influences media.31 This theory assumes that the public is generally uninformed about foreign affairs, leaving 
U.S. presidents and other government officials to frame international issues and dictate policies. Based on this 
assumption, the theory posits that media pander to the decision makers and policy implementers because they 
are in positions of power.32 As a result, media conform to government agendas and serve as government’s 
lapdog rather than a watchdog.33 
Additionally, Baum and Potter believe that when the public supports government, the media joins the “rally-
round-the-flag.”34 The rally-round-the-flag effect occurs when patriotic fervor unites Congress and the public 
behind the president in times of crisis.35 When this occurs, it creates an environment either in which the public is 
unwilling to listen to alternate opinions or when journalists self-censor.36  The rally-round-the-flag effect is further 
compounded in a media-rich environment in which readers can self-select publications that align with and 
reinforce their personal opinions. When such an environment is created, media are mobilized as tools to validate 
government policies rather than question them because the public will not tolerate dissenting voices. 
Robinson goes even further by citing, as an example of the CNN effect, the intervention on behalf of the 
starving population in Somalia in the 1990s – “an illusion of a news-driven media intervention.”37 He believes 
that government officials, having already decided on intervention, used media to generate popular support 
for the initiative.38 In this sense, the theory of manufactured consent does not negate the power of the media’s 
influence on public opinion. Rather, the theory diverges from the CNN effect by implicating that entities other 
than media are responsible for framing the information and setting the agenda.39 
29	 	Ibid.
30	 	Bernard	Cohen,	The Press and Foreign Policy,	(Princeton,	NJ:	Princeton	University	Press,	1963).	
31	 	Edward	S.	Herman	and	Noam	Chomsky,	Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media,	(New	York:	
Pantheon	Books,	1998).
32	 	Matthew	A.	Baum	and	Philip	B.	K.	Potter,	“The	Relationships	between	Mass	Media,	Public	Opinion,	and	Foreign	Policy:	
Toward	a	Theoretical	Synthesis,”	Annual Review of Political Science	11,	(2008):	39-65;	Nikos	Panagiotou,	“The	role	of	Mass	Media	in	
Foreign	Policy:	The	case	of	Greek	press,”	(Presented	at	the	Second	Hellenic	Observatory	PhD	Symposium	on	Modern	Greece,	London,	
United	Kingdom,	June	10,	2005).
33	 	Srivastava,	“The	Role	of	Media	in	Foreign	Policy,”	3;	Abbas	Malek	and	Krista	E.	Wiegand,	“News	Media	and	Foreign	Policy:	
an	Integrated	Review,”	in	News Media and Foreign Relations: A Multifaceted Perspective,	Abbas	Malek,	ed.	(Norwood,	NJ:	Ablex	
Publishing	Corporation,	1996):	3-29;	Catherine	A.	Luther	and	Michael	Schaller,	“Press	Images,	National	Identity,	and	Foreign	Policy:	A	
Case	study	of	US-Japan	Relations	from	1955-1995,”	Pacific Affairs	76,	no.	3	(2003):	464-5.
34	 	Baum	and	Potter,	“The	Relationships	between	Mass	Media,	Public	Opinion,	and	Foreign	Policy.”
35	 	John	E.	Mueller,	“Presidential	Popularity	from	Truman	to	Johnson,”	American Political Science Review	64,	no	1.	(1970):	18-
34,	retrieved	from	http://www.jstor.org/	stable/1955610.
36	 	William	D.	Baker	and	John	R.	O’Neal,	“Patriotism	or	Opinion	Leadership?:	the	Nature	and	Origins	of	the	“Rally	‘Round	
the	Flag”	Effect,”	The Journal of Conflict Resolution 45,	no.	5	(10,	2001):	661-687;	Terrence	L.	Chapman	and	Dan	Reiter,	“The	United	
Nations	Security	Council	and	the	Rally	‘Round	the	Flag	Effect,”	The Journal of Conflict Resolution	48,	no.	6	(12,	2004):	886-909.
37	 	Piers	Robinson,	“Operation	Restore	Hope	and	the	Illusion	of	News	Media	Driven	Intervention,”	Political Studies	49,	no.	5	(2001):	941.
38	 	Shahira	Fahmy,	Wayne	Wanta	and	Erik	C.	Nisbet,	“Mediated	Public	Diplomacy:	Satellite	TV	news	in	the	Arab	World	and	
Perception	Effects,”	International Communication Gazette	74,	no.	8,	(2012):	728-749.
39	 	Steven	Livingston	and	Todd	Eachus,	“Humanitarian	Crises	and	U.S.	Foreign	Policy:	Somalia	and	the	CNN	Effect	
Reconsidered,”	Political Communication 12, no. 4 (1995): 413–429.
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METHODOLOGY
How did President Obama’s response go from “gravely concerned” on February 21, 2011, to “We cannot stand 
idly by when a tyrant tells his people that there will be no mercy... where innocent men and women face brutality 
and death at the hands of their own government.” on March 19, 2011?40 
To determine which player, government or media, was the dominant opinion leader that persuaded the 
other to support humanitarian military intervention, the author chronologically compared articles written in four 
major U.S. newspapers and statements made by the Obama administration. Specifically, the author analyzed 
public documents from February 11, 2011, when the Libyan uprising began, to March 19, 2011, when President 
Obama delivered a prime-time radio address announcing that the U.S. was intervening in Libya as part of an 
international coalition. This month was the period of persuasion of the American public, and Obama’s speech 
marked the end of influence and the beginning of action. 
The newspapers – The Washington Post, The New York Times, USA Today, and The Wall Street Journal – 
were chosen because of their high circulation and, thus, their ability to inform and persuade the highest number 
of people. Relevant articles from these papers were found on a database using the keyword “Libya” and the 
specified date range. Additionally, the author collected official presidential statements from the White House 
online pressroom. 
News coverage was then categorized into three groups: news stories, editorials, and op-eds. News stories 
reveal the media’s viewpoint by framing the issue and selecting quotes in a way that expresses a particular 
argument. Although media alleged to report just the facts, coverage of an issue skews frequently toward a 
particular policy. According to the Pew Research Center, 58 percent of Americans believe that media is biased.41 
Editorials, unlike news articles, openly take a position on an issue for the publication. Similar to editorials, op-
eds take a stance on an issue, but they cannot be attributed to media because authors are unaffiliated with the 
publication. Typically, op-eds are written by academics, politicians, and issue advocates who serve as guest 
contributors – “experts who express their opinion about a salient issue within their field of expertise.”42 Since op-
eds could come from the Obama administration as well, these articles were carefully examined and sorted into 
persuasion by the U.S. government and opinion leaders. 
Persuasion was determined in two ways. Editorials, op-eds, and presidential statements were contextually 
analyzed to determine whether the article explicitly called for a no-fly zone. News articles were examined based 
on the sources they quoted and whether those secondary sources called for a no-fly zone. 
There are four disadvantages to this research method: The first two address data sample limitations and the 
later address methodological limitations. First, by not including international press coverage, the author risks 
ignoring the influence of international opinions, such as regional media like Al Jazeera, non-American English 
speaking outlets, and international government officials who may have influenced the American public and 
President Obama. However, international news coverage is not the primary source of information for American 
audiences. Political science scholar Robert Entman says that Americans “discount, mistrust or ignore” foreign 
sources because American culture is internally focused.43 Additionally, Mermin notes that a foreign publication’s 
word choice or how an argument is phrased might be off-putting to Americans.44 
Second, this method limits itself to print productions, excluding broadcast materials, to limit the volume 
of news coverage and due to limited access to video footage. However, the research is still valid despite these 
weaknesses because print is still the predominant form of communicating a thorough, thoughtful argument. 
Additionally, the research will still capture the timing for comparison of statements made by government officials 
and journalists. 
40	 	Obama,	“Remarks	by	the	President	on	the	Situation	in	Libya.”
41	 	“Amid	Criticism,	Support	for	Media’s	‘Watchdog’	Role	Stands	Out,”	Pew	Research	Center,	August	8,	2013,	http://www.
people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/8-8-2013%20Media%20Attitudes%20Release.pdf.
42	 	Guy	J.	Golan,	“The	Gates	of	op-ed	Diplomacy:	Newspaper	framing	the	2011	Egyptian	Revolution,”	The International 
Communication Gazette 75, no.4 (2013): 360.
43	 	Robert	M.	Entman,	Projections of Power: Framing News, Public Opinion, and U.S. Foreign Policy,	(Chicago:	University	of	
Chicago	Press,	2004).
44	 	Jonathan	Mermin,	Debating War and Peace: Media Coverage of U.S. Intervention in the Post-Vietnam Era,”	(Princeton,	NJ:	
Princeton	University	Press,	1999).
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Third, the method of analyzing persuasion is a qualitative one that lacks a code and coder reliability. As such, 
this research could be biased, unconsciously skewed by the author’s opinion, and is not easily replicated. Finally, 
single case studies are usually too small in scope, making it hard to determine causation conclusively.
Data collection techniques
For this case study, the author determined if the empirical data gathered matched one of the two predicted 
outcomes, based on the theories and concepts in the literature review, using a technique called pattern matching.45 
If the pattern coincided with one of the two predicted results, this case study validates that theory.
RESULTS
Between February 15, 2011, and March 20, 2011, The New York Times published 324 articles on Libya, The 
Wall Street Journal published 277, The Washington Post had 254, and USA Today had a mere 51. For the first 
three papers, the average was 10 relevant articles a day. Initially, the articles focused on Gadhafi, evacuating 
international civilians, and reporting the on-the-ground events. Later, the focus shifted to how the international 
community should respond, Libyan refugees, and the impact the civil war was having on gas prices. In addition 
to factually reporting the events, all papers wrote extensively in editorials and featured articles by key opinion 
leaders in an effort to inform and persuade readers.
Calls for Action
The first research question asked, “Who was first to call the American people to action, the U.S. government or 
the U.S. media?”
Based on the data collected, the first true cry for intervention was neither from the government nor media, but 
from a defected Libyan official. On February 19, four days after the protests began, The New York Times quoted 
from an opposition leader exiled in Oslo who lamented, “The international community is watching, why isn’t 
anyone helping us?”46 The first call for a no-fly zone also came from a Libyan, Omar al Dabashi, who resigned as 
the country’s U.N. delegate once the violence began. He said that Gadhafi “declared a genocide against his own 
people” and called for a no-fly zone to prevent Gadhafi from “importing mercenaries.”47 While this quote was 
printed in the news, it cannot be attributed to the media’s point of view or persuasion because it was newsworthy 
rather than a skewed point of view, a distinction addressed shortly in this paper. 
The Obama administration
The initial response from the Obama administration once the violence started was limited, with only seven official 
statements from Obama himself, and vague. U.S. Department of State spokesman P.J. Crowley said that the 
U.S. government was “gravely concerned” with the violence and asked “the governments of Bahrain, Libya, and 
Yemen” to “show restraint in responding to peaceful protests.”48 By then the international community had already 
aggressively condemned Gadhafi. For example, British Foreign Minister William Hague described what was 
occurring as “unacceptable” and “horrifying.”49 Obama made a public remark on February 23, when he used 
language similar to his peers saying, “The suffering and bloodshed is outrageous and unacceptable.”50 Despite 
calling for Gadhafi to step down, freezing $30 billion in Libyan assets, and moving naval ships to the area, 
Obama and his administration did not publicly call for a no-fly zone until after the U.N. resolution authorized 
such actions on March 18, 2011.51
45	 	Robert	K.	Yin,	Case study research: Design and methods, 5th	edition.	(Beverly	Hills,	CA:	SAGE	Publications,	Inc.,	2003).
46	 	Anthony	Shadid,	“Clashes	in	Libya	Worsen	as	Army	Crushes	Dissent,”	New York Times, February 19, 2011. 
47	 	Margaret	Coker,	Charles	Levinson,	and	Tahani	Kerrar-Lewsly,	“Gadhafi	Battles	to	Hang	On	---	Libya	Regime	Fires	on	
Protestors	in	Capital;	Nation	Fractures;	Diplomats	Break	Ties,”	Wall Street Journal,	February	22,	2011;	“Liberating	Libya,”	Wall Street 
Journal, February 22, 2011.
48	 	Eric	Schmitt,	“U.S.	‘gravely	concerned’	over	violence	in	Libya,”	New York Times, February 21, 2011.
49	 	Paul	Wolfowitz,	“The	U.S.	Can	Help	Libyans	Defeat	Gadhafi,”	Wall Street Journal, February 22, 2011.
50	 	Barack	Obama,	“Remarks	by	the	President	on	Libya,”	February	23,	2011,	http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2011/02/23/remarks-president-libya.
51 	Karen	DeYoung	and	Colum	Lynch,	“Obama	ratchets	up	the	pressure	on	Gaddfi,”	Washington Post,	February	26,	2011;	
Kareem	Fahim	and	David	D.	Kirkpatrick,	“Qaddafi’s	Forces	are	Hitting	Back	at	Libyan	Rebels,”	Washington Post,	March	1,	2011;	Karen	
DeYoung	and	Joby	Warrick,	“U.S.,	allies	step	up	pressure	on	Libya,”	Washington Post,	March	1,	2011.
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The Media
On the other hand, a newspaper called for military intervention rather swiftly in an editorial in The Wall Street 
Journal. In a February 22 piece called “Liberating Libya”, the paper said:52 
Tell the Libyan armed forces that the West will bomb their airfields if they continue to slaughter 
their people. Arming the demonstrators also cannot be ruled out. Now that the Libyan people 
are rising against him, they deserve urgent and tangible American support.
Similarly, The Washington Post published an editorial that called for “not just condemnation but action by 
the outside world.”53 The New York Times followed suit and published an editorial the next day called “Libya’s 
Butcher,” which called for the international community to condemn and punish Gadhafi.54 
In the contest of who called for intervention first, the most persuasive would be the Libyan opinion leader 
Dabashi. This is to be expected because those with strong ties to the affected population have the strongest desire 
to see a crisis end. Between media and government, media were the first to call for action. The media were not 
only the first to call for a no-fly zone, but there also was a significant gap as Obama and his administration did 
not publically support intervention until one month later. 
Persuasion
The second research question asked: “Who spoke most persuasively to convince the American public that a 
humanitarian military intervention was necessary?”
The Obama Administration
Obama and his administration cited several reasons for not being advocates for intervention. Initially, Secretary 
of State Hillary Clinton stated that the United States refrained from action because “the safety and well-being 
of Americans [was] our highest priority.”55 However, even after Americans were evacuated from Libya, Obama 
was hesitant to take a leadership role. According to news coverage, Obama was loath to make bold statements 
or actions because he wanted to avoid undermining the uprising’s legitimacy. He also wanted to avoid the 
perception that “the United States would once again be meddling in the Middle East” after inheriting wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.56 In order to avoid the labels “neo-colonial” or “empire” and to avoid the mistakes of the 
Bush administration, President Obama was adamant that the international community act in unison and have 
approval from the United Nations.57 
In fact, the strongest advocates against intervention were U.S. military leaders, both active and retired. On 
March 2, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates testified before members of Congress and urged caution, saying that 
the operation would be costly, complex, and draw resources from ongoing operations in Afghanistan.58 He later 
clarified his statement, “This is not a question of whether we or our allies can do this. We can do it. The question 
is whether it’s a wise thing to do.”59 Finally, Gates argued that the operation would not be a neutral operation, 
since “a no-fly zone begins with an attack on Libya to destroy the air defenses.”60 Others within the defense 
community concurred by stating that it involved more than “telling people not to fly airplanes” and discussed the 
52	 	“Liberating	Libya.”
53	 	“Atrocities	in	Libya,”	Washington Post, February 22, 2011.
54	 	“Libya’s	Butcher,”	New York Times, February 23, 2011.
55	 	Mark	Landler,	“U.S.	Condemns	Libyan	Tumult	but	Makes	No	Threats,”	New York Times, February 23, 2011.
56	 	Landler,	“U.S.	Condemns	Libyan	Tumult	but	Makes	No	Threats”;	Scott	Wilson	and	Edward	Cody,	“Obama	Joins	E.U.	in	
Cautious	Support	for	Libyan	Rebels,”	Washington Post,	March	12,	2011;	Mark	Landler	and	Thom	Shanker,	“Warships	Move	In	as	
U.S.	Readies	a	Range	of	Options	for	Qaddafi’s	Ouster,”	New York Times,	March	1,	2011;	David	E.	Sanger	and	Thom	Shanker,	“Discord	
Grows	On	the	Politics	of	Intervention,”	New York Times,	March	8,	2011;	Scott	Wilson	and	Joby	Warrick,	“Obama	appeals	directly	to	
top	Libyan	officials,”	Washington Post,	March	8,	2011.
57	 	“Engineering	Passivity,”	Washington Post,	March	10,	2011.
58	 	Karen	DeYoung	and	Craig	Whitlock,	“U.S.	Defense	Leaders	Warn	of	Risks	in	Enforcing	No-Fly	Zone,”	Washington Post,	March	2,	2011.
59	 	Peter	Finn	and	Scott	Wilson,	“Gates:	‘We	have	the	resources’	if	Obama	orders	a	no-fly	zone,”	Washington Post,	March	23,	2011.
60	 	David	E.	Sanger	and	Thom	Shanker,	“Gates	Warns	of	the	Risks	of	Imposing	a	No-Flight	Zone	Over	Libya,”	New York Times,	March	3,	2011.
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fact that no-fly zones might not be as effective as the advocates would claim.61 Additionally, other members of the 
Obama administration, including White House Chief of Staff William Daley and U.S. Ambassador to NATO Ivo 
Daalder, dampened the calls for no-fly zones by stating it’s more than “just a video game” and “it is not going 
to be the solution to every problem.”62 
The initial reluctance to take a position and, later, the contradictory opinions regarding intervention meant 
that the Obama administration could not convince the American public because it did not take a firm stance on 
the issue. 
The Media
Media, on the other hand, were vocal from the start in favor of helping the Libyan people by any means necessary. 
The press persuaded the American public in three ways: the volume of coverage, framing (rhetoric and quotes 
used), and, most directly, editorials.
As stated before, the volume of articles published by the four newspapers during that month was extremely 
high. By bringing the issue to the public’s attention by setting the agenda of media coverage, the media played 
a role in the government’s policy-making. By framing the Libyan crisis, the media subtly shaped the American 
public’s opinion. 
Indirectly, the media persuaded the American public to be in favor of intervention because of how they 
framed the conflict and whose opinion they quoted. Describing Gadhafi as “quixotic,” “erratic,” a “butcher,” 
“strongman,” and a “dictator,” the media painted the picture of an archetypical villain.63 They also described his 
actions as “genocide,” “a bloodbath,” and “murder.”64
The media featured quotes from Libyans as reliable authorities, to support arguments made in the editorials. 
In an early news article from The New York Times, Libya’s newly resigned ambassador to the United Nations, 
Abdurrahman Shalgham, compared Gadhafi with Pol Pot and Hitler.65 When Shalgham spoke to the United 
Nations Security Council, The Washington Post said he “wept as he pleaded for international intervention saying, 
‘Gaddafi is telling his people either I rule over you or I will kill you’.”66 Later, when momentum for intervention 
was stalling, numerous news articles featured quotes from Libyans calling for help and voicing their frustration at 
the international community.67 One particularly powerful article quoted a rebel stating:68
These politicians are liars. They just talk and talk, but they do nothing. Where is America? Where 
are the Europeans? Even the Arabs, they are all just the same. They keep quiet. They just watch 
us as we die. I don’t have help except my God. The hands of the international community are 
covered in blood.
61	 	Elisabeth	Bumiller,	“Gates	Plays	Down	Idea	of	U.S.	Force	in	Libya,”	New York Times,	March	2,	2011.
62	 	Joseph	Berger,	“U.S.	Senators	Call	for	No-Flight	Zone	Over	Libya,”	New York Times,	March	7,	2011.
63	 	Abdurrahman,	“What	if	Libya	Staged	a	Revolution?”;	Richard	Cohen,	“Gaddafi’s	killer	instinct,”	Washington Post,	March	
15,	2011;	Fahim	and	Kirkpatrick,	“Qaddafi’s	Grip	on	the	Capital	Tightens”;	Jamie	M.	Fly,	“A	Moral	Obligation	to	Intervene,”	USA Today, 
March	4,	2011;	Hastings,	“Inside	Obama’s	War	Room”;	Kirkpatrick	and	El	Naggar,	“Qaddafi’s	forces	strike	with	fury	as	unrest	grows”;	
“Libya’s	Butcher”;	“Stopping	Qaddafi,”	New York Times,	February	25,	2011;	“Qaddafi’s	Crimes	and	Fantasies,”	New York Times, March	
1,	2011;	“Atrocities	in	Libya”;	Paul	Wolfowitz,	“The	Case	for	Backing	Libya’s	Rebels,”	Wall Street Journal,	March	11,	2011.
64	 	Ibid.
65	 	David	Kirkpatrick	and	Kareem	Fahim,	“Qaddafi	forces	violently	quell	capital	protest”	New York Times, February 26, 2011.
66	 	“A	Passive	President,”	Washington Post, February 27, 2011.
67	 	Leila	Fadel	and	Steve	Hendrix,	“Libya’s	Rebels	Hold	Back	Gaddafi	forces,”	Washington Post,	March	3,	2011;	Charles	
Levinson,	Sam	Dagher	and	Margaret	Coker,	“Middle	East:	They	Just	Kept	Bombing	and	Bombing,”	Wall Street Journal,	March	11,	
2011;	Anthony	Shadid,	“Momentum	Shifts	as	Libyan	Rebels	Flee	an	Oil	Town,”	New York Times,	March	11,	2011;	Yaroslav	Trofimov,	
Joe	Lauria	and	Jay	Solomon	“World	News:	Gadhafi	Closes	In,	as	Allies	Huddle	---	Regime	Presses	Rebels	Near	Their	Stronghold,	as	
U.N.	Again	Debates	No-Fly	Zone;	U.S.	Appoints	Liaison	to	Opposition,”	Wall Street Journal.	March	15,	2011;	Sudarsan	Raghavan,	
“Gaddafi’s	forces	pound	key	city,”	Washington Post,	March	16,	2011.
68	 	Raghavan,	“Gaddafi’s	forces	pound	key	city.”
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Rarely did the newspapers feature quotes from Gadhafi himself or his government, other than to illustrate 
their desire for violent control. By only telling one side of Libya’s story, the media acted in a biased manner rather 
than an impartial report of facts. News coverage skewed the information in such a way as to prevent any rational 
person from supporting Gadhafi’s regime.
Not so subtly, the editorials advocated for action and admonished the Obama administration for failing to 
call for action. With the exception of USA Today, which lauded Obama’s decision to seek international support 
and proceed slowly, the editorials reflected a desire for American leadership.69 Describing Obama’s desire for 
consensus as “prudence to the point of procrastination” editorials pleaded for action before it was too late to be 
of assistance.70 In a particularly hostile editorial, The Wall Street Journal lamented:71
Ghadafi can also only prevail at this stage through a murderous campaign that will make 
U.S. passivity complicit in a bloodbath. They have internalized their own critique of the Bush 
Administration to such a degree that they are paralyzed to act even against a dictator as reviled 
and blood-stained as Gadhafi, and even though it would not require the deployment of U.S. 
troops. Mr. Obama won’t lead the world because he truly seems to believe that U.S. leadership 
is morally suspect.
In addition to calling Obama a bystander to history, many editorials recalled past mistakes of American 
presidents that led to deaths of innocents and foretold similar fates because of Obama’s lack of leadership:72 
When the U.S. fails to lead, the world reverts to its default mode as a diplomatic Tower of 
Babel. Everyone discusses “options” and “contingencies” but no one has the will to act, while the 
predators march. When the U.S. chooses to act like everyone else, the result is Rwanda, Darfur 
and now Libya.
Finally, publications also noted that failing to take action teaches “dictators, and the populations they oppress, 
that you can get away with large-scale mayhem if you avoid YouTube” and that “the U.S. is a feeble friend and 
an ineffectual foe, paralyzed by its own ambivalence.”73
In the bluntest advocacy of American exceptionalism, Richard Cohen wrote in The Washington Post, “It’s 
the United States that matters. We have the bucks. We have the expertise. We have the military. We lead, they 
follow. This may not be as it ought to be. It is, however, how it is.”74 With such powerfully compelling reasons to 
help Libya, the media helped persuade the American public to demand action. 
Opinion Leaders
Though Obama and his administration clearly did not corral the American public into supporting the humanitarian 
intervention, the data revealed that the media were not the sole influencer of public opinion. Key opinion leaders, 
both domestic and international, used op-eds as a platform to speak to the public. 
Domestically, the Senate, liberal humanitarians, and hawkish neoconservatives alike called for action. 
Democratic Reps. Jim McDermott, Mike Honda, Jim McGovern, and Keith Ellison were the first Congress members 
69	 	“No-fly	zone	in	Libya	carries	more	risks	than	rewards,”	USA Today,	March	4,	2011;	“Turtle	Bay	to	the	Rescue,”	Wall Street 
Journal,	February	23,	2011;	“Last	on	Libya,”	Washington Post,	February	24,	2011;	“Stopping	Qaddafi”;	“Outflanked	by	France,”	
Wall Street Journal,	February	26,	2011;	“The	Reluctant	American,”	Wall Street Journal,	March	1,	2011;	Fly,	“A	Moral	Obligation	to	
Intervene”;	Charles	Krauthammer,	“From	Baghdad	to	Benghazi,”	Washington Post,	March	4,	2011.
70	 	Cohen,	“Gaddafi’s	Killer	Instinct;”	Daniel	Henninger,	“Is	U.S.	Democracy	Just	Talk?”	Wall Street Journal,	March	10,	2011;	
“Engineering	Passivity.”
71	 	“Obama’s	Libyan	Abdication,”	Wall Street Journal,	March	7,	2011.
72	 	“The	Obama	Doctrine,”	Wall Street Journal,	March	12,	2011;	Ahmad	Chalabi,	“The	Libyan	Uprising:	Lessons	from	Iraq”	Wall 
Street Journal,	Feb.	28,	2011;	Fly,	“A	Moral	Obligation	to	Intervene;”	Daniel	Henninger,	“The	Collapse	of	Internationalism,”	Wall Street 
Journal	March	17,	2011.
73	 	Eliot	Cohen,	“Washington’s	Dithering	on	Libya,”	Wall Street Journal,	March	12,	2011.
74	 	Cohen,	“Gaddafi’s	Killer	Instinct.”
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to call for a no-fly zone in a joint statement.75 Former presidential nominees and Sens. John Kerry, John McCain, 
and Joe Lieberman were the most public advocates for the no-fly zone.76 As Sen. McCain stated, “We can’t 
risk allowing Qaddafi to massacre people from the air.”77 On March 1, 2011, the Senate passed a resolution 
condemning the attack on civilians in Libya and, among other things, urged “the United Nations Security Council 
to take such further action as may be necessary to protect civilians in Libya from attack, including the possible 
imposition of a no-fly zone over Libyan territory.”78 
Liberal humanists saw action as a moral imperative – obligated to prevent mass killings – and advocated for 
action based on the U.N. Responsibility to Protect doctrine. Called “humanitarian Vulcans” by Michael Hastings, 
these opinion leaders included Obama’s advisers, including U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice and National Security 
Council staffer Samantha Power, who were worried that inaction would make America morally complicit.79 The 
strongest advocate of humanitarian intervention was Anne-Marie Slaughter, former director of policy planning 
at the Department of State. She penned the op-ed “Fiddling While Libya Burns” and persuasively stated, “The 
international community cannot stand by and watch the massacre of Libyan protesters. In Rwanda we watched. 
In Kosovo we acted.”80
Meanwhile, neoconservatives were concerned about global security. On February 25, 2011, 41 conservative 
foreign policy analysts, including Robert Kagan, “released a letter urging the president to act more forcefully.”81 
Additionally, Paul Wolfowitz and Elliott Abrams, neoconservatives and architects of former President George W. 
Bush’s foreign policy with no affiliation to the Obama administration, published numerous op-eds. In one piece, 
Wolfowitz stated, “One has to be morally blind not to be moved by the spectacle of brave Libyans standing up to 
Moammar Gadhafi’s tanks and bombs and mercenaries.”82
CONCLUSIONS
As a whole, the press and the opinion leaders featured in the news were in favor of stopping Gadhafi and aiding 
the rebels and civilians. Media were essential in convincing the Obama administration to join the bandwagon 
and support humanitarian military intervention. 
Despite the evidence that media persuaded the Obama administration to take action because media stirred 
up public opinion, a direct impact was not proven. There is a possible correlation, but not causation, because too 
many other voices, international and domestic opinion leaders in particular, could have persuaded the public or 
the Obama administration to act.
Based on the multitude of voices, the author rejects the premise of the original dual hypothesis that the public 
support was chiefly corralled by either the U.S. government or the U.S. media. Because more than one actor 
influenced the decision to act, the author proposes Jacobsen’s hypothesis that the CNN effect is not, by itself, 
sufficient to cause interventions.83 Jacobsen cites four criteria in addition to the CNN effect required for actions 
such as those in Libya to take place: humanitarian need, domestic support, national interests, and feasibility 
of success.84 He stresses that this last category entails not only a victorious outcome, but also a quick one with 
minimal causalities.85 Based on the data collected, all metrics were met in the case of Libya and this hypothesis 
is better suited than either the CNN effect or the theory of manufactured consent. 
75	 	Felicia	Sonmez,	“U.S.	Lawmakers	Step	Up	Criticism	of	Libya’s	Gaddafi,”	Washington Post, February 23, 2011.
76	 	Joby	Warrick,	“Clinton	Preps	to	Put	More	Pressure	on	Gaddafi,”	Washington Post,	February	28,	2011;	John	F.	Kerry,	“Libya:	
An	Iraq	Redux?”	Washington Post,	March	11,	2011.
77	 	Berger,	“U.S.	Senators	Call	for	No-Flight	Zone.”
78	 	Senate	Resolution	85,	“Condemning	Violations	of	Human	Rights	in	Libya,”	2011.
79	 	Hastings,	“Inside	Obama’s	War	Room;”	Adam	Entous,	Jay	Solomon	and	Alistair	MacDonald,	“World	News:	Europe	Pressure,	
Arab	Support	Helped	Turn	U.S.”	Wall Street Journal,	March	19,	2011;	Scott	Wilson	and	Joby	Warrick,	“Obama’s	Shift	Toward	Military	
Action,”	Washington Post,	March	19,	2011.
80	 	Anne-Marie	Slaughter,	“Fiddling	While	Libya	Burns,”	New York Times,	March	13,	2011.
81	 	Jonathan	Weisman,	“Middle	East:	Delay	in	Washington’s	Response	Draws	New	Round	of	Criticism,”	Wall Street Journal, 
February 26, 2011.
82	 	Wolfowitz,	“The	Case	for	Backing	Libya’s	Rebels.”
83	 	Peter	Jacobsen,	“National	Interest,	Humanitarianism	or	CNN:	What	Triggers	UN	Peace	Enforcement	After	the	Cold	War?”	
Journal of Peace Research	33,	no.	2	(1996):	205-15.
84	 	Ibid.
85	 	Peter	Jacobsen,	“Focus	on	the	CNN	Effect	Misses	the	Point:	The	Real	Media	Impact	on	Conflict	Management	is	Invisible	
and	Indirect,”	Journal of Peace Research	37,	no.	2	(2000):	131-143.
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Limitations and Future Research
As stated in the methodology section, limiting the collected data to four major newspapers limited the information 
collected and may have skewed the results. These publications were chosen based on circulation, but future 
research might replicate this study and include other newspapers, television broadcasts, radio, social media, and 
other forms of media to verify the conclusion reached in this publication. 
Data was further restricted because this paper only chronicled public documents, while international foreign 
policy decisions are secretive, behind-closed-door negotiations among members of the U.N. Security Council, 
including the U. S., and other international actors, including the Arab League, the African Union, the European 
Union, and NATO. It is possible that peer pressure and a worldwide call to action dictated Obama’s decision to 
act. Results supporting the role of media and opinion leaders by op-eds would be more conclusive if future studies 
were able to investigate and rule out the influence of traditional diplomacy as the primary motive for intervention.
Finally, single case studies are small in scope, making it hard to conclusively determine causation. It would 
be interesting to compare the media coverage of the same event in other countries, such as France and the 
United Kingdom, which were outspoken advocates of the intervention in the the U.N., or Russia, which was not. 
Alternatively, a multiple case study that examined other Arab Spring uprisings that did not involve interventions 
would be helpful to see if media coverage of those events were significantly different from Libya in volume of 
coverage or advocacy. If media coverage differed, it would reinforce this paper’s results.
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